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Abstract
This paper examines the role of other-regarding behavior as a mech-
anism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource
use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling re-
source stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a
social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common
pool resource, we show that when reputational considerations matter and
a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sus-
tainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where
norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what
extent such coexistence depends on the environment.
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1 Introduction
Local and global ecosystems are under growing pressure worldwide, and their
sustainable management indisputably calls for the stakeholders’ cooperative ef-
forts [18]. History has taught us that the livelihood of our species is inextricably
related to our ability to cooperate, in the sense of restraining use of natural
resources to sustainable levels, rather than giving in to excessive resource ap-
propriation. However, depending on the characteristics of the system at hand,
tensions between individual and collective good may undermine such norms of
restraint. Common-pool resources (CPRs) where beneficiaries of the resource
have open access to it are a notable case of appropriation externality paving
the way for short-sighted resource utilization: all agents would be better off if
they collectively restrained extraction but if the impact of one’s action on the
resource stock is ignored, it is individually rational not to do it. Thus, maintain-
ing cooperation against the myopic self-interest of a potentially large fraction
of individual users unwilling to restrict their behavior for the collective good,
and despite growing environmental pressure, is a challenging task that often
depends on a multitude of factors, as both successful and unsuccessful environ-
mental management has shown [25]. Nevertheless, field work [26], controlled
experiments involving participants playing stylized games aimed at reflecting
the trade-offs inherent in these social dilemmas (e.g., public good [17] and CPR
[16] games), as well as casual observation, suggest that human beings are able
to overcome the obstacles to cooperation in a variety of settings.
Many explanations have been proposed to account for the widely-observed
departures from the rational-agent models’ predictions [12] of collectively in-
efficient resource management in the absence of regulatory institutions. Es-
tablished mechanisms that have been advanced to account for the evolution of
cooperation are [23]: kin selection (the inclination of related individuals to en-
gage in cooperative behavior), direct reciprocity (the “I will scratch your back
if you scratch mine” attitude towards reciprocating), indirect reciprocity (I will
scratch your back because someone else scratched mine), network reciprocity
(spatial structure is assumed to allow for unevenly mixed populations where
some individuals interact more frequently than others) and multilevel selection
(where the population is divided into groups whose members are allowed to en-
act different strategies depending on whether they are matched with own-group
members or with members of other groups). More recently the term of assort-
ment, indicating the “degree of segregation of different types of individuals into
different groups” as Pepper [28] puts it, has gained consensus among scholars for
its generality. See [37] and [10] for recent contributions to the group selection
debate. It should be noted that many other mechanisms with a certain degree
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of overlapping characteristics have been employed in various disciplines to high-
light the tension between in-group and outsiders; among others, parochialism
[5] and homophily [7]. Lastly, in an experimental setting involving the repeated
public goods game, reward is shown to be conducive to cooperation [34].
These mechanisms have been shown to suffice for the evolution of cooperation
in Prisoner’s Dilemma games whenever the payoffs are such that the benefit-to-
cost ratio of the cooperative action exceeds a certain mechanism-specific thresh-
old. While the above mechanisms incorporate some of the empirically observed
factors that influence the success of collective action, such as the topology of in-
teractions and group size, we postulate that the link to other important drivers
of cooperation needs to be made explicit if one wants to attempt to bridge the
gap between the empirical findings on commons management and the theory.
In the present paper we aim to analyze a simple model that departs from the
full-rationality paradigm by placing emphasis on two such drivers: the presence
of individuals with other-regarding preferences and the conformist pressure in
the direction of norm compliance arising from fear of community disapproval.
Laboratory experiments, such as [9] and [20], respectively suggest that both
are relevant, while contributions from social psychology [6] and the empirical
literature on the commons [27] stress the importance of the second driver. For
what concerns the empirical findings, the work of Ostrom [25, 26] has suggested
that many CPRs have escaped the trap of the tragedy of the commons by being
managed in a self-organizing manner with mechanisms such as rules, norms and
graduated sanctions favoring cooperation among users. Such mechanisms may
result from the repeated interactions of the resource users: given suitable con-
ditions, for example in terms of knowledge of the ecosystem by the community
members, they could develop a sense of what behavior is acceptable with respect
to resource use.
The enforcement of the proper behavior or sanctioning thereof will take dif-
ferent forms depending on the features of the social and resource system at
hand. One increasingly studied class concerns social norms. Following the work
of Sethi and Somanathan [31], much attention has been given to the role of
costly punishment of defectors in promoting cooperation; recent contributions
aimed at extending their setup have been proposed by Noailly et al. [22] and
Sethi and Somanathan [32] While both retain the three agent types format,
with defectors, cooperators and enforcers bearing the costs of punishment, the
former allow for spatial structure in the interactions, and the latter introduce
a concern for reciprocity among the agents. Yet, the empirical literature on
the commons argues that a variety of sanctioning mechanisms against norm
violators are utilized to promote successful management of irrigation systems,
fisheries, pastures and forests ([25], ch. 8 and 11 of [2]). Moreover, as sug-
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gested by the literature on social capital [3], [24], [15]), resource appropriators
embedded in a social context can often rely on a wider set of tools than the tra-
ditionally considered costly sanctioning of free-riding behavior. When the result
of one’s actions is observable, be it the resource extraction itself or the outcome
of a productive activity that is dependent on the latter, field and experimental
evidence suggests that individuals belonging to a community act more coopera-
tively than when in isolation, as a result of their exposure to social reprobation.
With regards to water management institutions, norms of social consensus are
often deemed as important as technical rationality [29]. Moreover, according
to [11]: “Experimental results from behavioral economics, evolutionary game
theory and neuroscience have firmly established that human choice is a social,
not self-regarding, phenomenon. [. . . ] Human decision-making cannot be accu-
rately predicted without reference to social context”. Recent evidence on the
importance of the social context in guiding individual behavior is found in [9]
and [1].
In the present paper we focus on one such mechanism, which we term equity-
driven ostracism, by which we refer to the exclusion of norm-violators from
community privileges or social acceptance.1 The underlying idea is that ap-
propriators’ decisions about how much effort to exert in the extraction of a
natural resource are based on the prevailing norms that have emerged in the
community, in addition to the usual efficiency considerations. As a result of
the compliance decision with respect to the norm, those who deviate (the de-
fectors) may be refused resources and support by those who comply. As an
example, the ostracism costs considered here could be thought of as originating
from destruction of defector’s crop by the cooperators, or simply from refusal
of help by the community towards a defector in the form of denial of loan of
machinery or means of transportation needed to take the harvest to the market.
The rationale for this behavior is that, in a community of individuals who share
access to a natural resource, those who restrain their extraction level to the
socially acceptable level will not show the same level of support they have for
fellow cooperators, when it comes to defectors. In Tarui et al.’s words [35]: ’The
typical successful management regime has some means of limiting access to the
commons and some means of punishment for over-harvesting. Access may be re-
stricted to members of a particular community or group. Community members
are responsible for monitoring and enforcement. Punishment can involve some
type of loss of privilege, either temporary or permanent, or, for major offenses,
banishment from the group’. We assume that, while the resource stock level is
not directly observable, the extractive efforts of individul players can be inferred
1The term ostracism is to be read here as a refusal of help towards norm violators rather
than a physical displacement of the latter, as will be clarified in the following discussion.
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by means of yield comparisons, as detailed in Section 2.2. The inherent tradeoff
between unrestricted profit seeking and norm adherence can be visualized in
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Interactions between the composition of the population, resource
abundance and norm enforcement
This schematization allows us to highlight the ever-changing conditions faced
by appropriators choosing among extraction patterns. If the number of cooper-
ators increases, so will the resource stock, favoring the defectors the most (due
to their behavior being unrestricted by the norm) and rendering opportunistic
behavior more profitable, thus posing unfavorable selective pressure on the coop-
erators’ population. These trends are captured by the outer arrows originating
from the cooperators in Figure 1, where a “+” sign indicates that both variables
change in the same direction (e.g. more cooperators will lead to more resource)
while a “-” sign indicates an inverse relationship (e.g. more social dissaproval
leads to less defector payoff). However, as shown by the inner arrows, an increase
in the number of cooperators also leads to greater social disapproval towards
norm violators, as fewer defectors will face ostracism by a larger community
of norm followers, denying them the benefits of cooperation. We implement
this simple mechanism in an evolutionary framework in order to allow for de-
partures from optimizing behavior as prescribed by Nash equilibrium and to
account for the dynamic nature of common property resources. Namely, rather
than assuming that the resource appropriators instantaneously maximize their
material well-being in a repeated-interaction model with discounted future, we
let evolution gradually shape the proportion of agents playing a given strategy
by favoring the more successful one. The advantage of this bounded rational-
ity approach (imitate the successful behavior with inertia) is that it avoids the
downfalls of the multiplicity of equilibria and lack of robustness to noise, while
retaining the behavioral tendency to move in the direction of a more profitable
strategy.2
The results of the analysis, presented in Section 2, suggest that both monomor-
2For an example of a standard game theoretic approach, see [21]; for a critique of the
commonly used approaches in the economic analysis of common property, see [32].
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phic and dimorphic populations emerge: that is we find stable full compliance
and full defection equilibria as in Sethi and Somanathan [31], but also mixed
equilibria where both types coexist. In Section 3 we investigate the impact of
variation in environmental conditions, by allowing for variability in the rate of
resource regeneration as well for a multiplicity of extraction strategies subject
to evolutionary pressure. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
2 A model of coupled socio and resource dynam-
ics
We examine the role of other-regarding behavior as a mechanism for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social
and environmental conditions. This is done by modeling the evolution of compli-
ance to a social norm prescribing conformity to an agreed extraction level, and
its coevolution with a CPR stock dynamic [27]. The coupled dynamics allow us
to investigate the stability of cooperation in a population of resource users who
have symmetrical access to it and are not only concerned with their own yield
from productive use of the resource, but also with their status with respect to
other community members, as acceptance to the community is at stake. Pay-
off comparisons (e.g. with respect to crop size) lead to ostracism of the norm
violators by the cooperating community, which denies defectors the benefits of
resource and knowledge support, imposing losses on them that may offset those
incurred by cooperators when restricting resource extraction practices to more
sustainable ones. That is, individuals face a trade-off: on the one hand they can
extract resource at individually optimal (but socially detrimental, [35]) levels
without restricting usage, or on the other hand they can constrain themselves to
a socially agreed upon acceptable level. By doing so, their conventional materi-
alistic pay-off is necessarily below that of the non-cooperating agents, because
of the above mentioned lower extraction and consequently reduced yield (which
is increasing in the extraction effort). However, violators of the social norm are
penalized by being excluded from the help of the cooperating community (e.g.
in bringing the yield to the market): such defectors-specific ostracism costs have
a variable magnitude that depends on the relative size of the cooperating com-
munity, since at low frequencies of cooperative agent types, the defectors will
incur only mild consequences, but at high enough frequencies of cooperators,
the former may incur high enough ostracism costs that it will be advantageous
to be part of the sustainable community. Lindbeck [19] suggests the following
property of norms: “a social norm is felt more strongly, the greater the number
of individuals who obey it. Thus, the adherence to a social norm is a choice con-
8
ditioned on other individuals’ adherence to the same norm. The psychological
explanation for this type of behavior may be either that disapproval from others
is more troubling if expressed by many people than by few or that other people’s
behavior is assumed to signal information about what is proper or potentially
successful behavior.”
Agents are considered as productive units (one can think of an agent as an
individual or a family), whose share of the total production (e.g. the size of their
crop) is proportional to the share of their appropriation effort with respect to the
aggregate effort. Their source of revenue is assumed to positively depend on two
factors: the availability of an indispensable resource for both productivity and
livelihood, such as water broadly conceived, and the amount of effort agents put
in their productive (income-generating) actions. That is, both the resource and
the appropriation effort enter in the agents’ (twice-continuously differentiable)
production function f(E,R), where E represents the community effort (e.g. the
aggregate water usage) resulting from the actions of the n agents comprising it,
and R is the resource available to the community (which may either be entirely
consumed in a given time period, or saved in part for future consumption).
Formally, letting ei be the individual effort (i.e. his/her resource uptake), which
can either take value ec for a cooperator or ed for a defector, with ec<ed due
to the more sustainable practices of the former, the following inequalities are
therefore assumed to hold3:
∂f(E,R)
∂E
> 0, ∂f(E,R)
∂R
> 0, ∂
2f(E,R)
∂E2
≤ 0, ∂
2f(E,R)
∂E∂R
≥ 0, ∂(f(E,R)/E)
∂R
≥ 0
It is useful to consider again the joint level of effort E resulting from the actions
of the n agents choosing their level of effort ei; letting fc ∈ [0, 1] be the propor-
tion of cooperators, we have E = n [fcec + (1− fc)ed] . We assume that n is
fixed, so that entry is ruled out, while fc is continuous and non-negative, and
see that for positive levels of ec and ed, the total level of effort is a decreasing
function of the frequency of cooperators. The two effort levels, which are here
assumed to sum up the behavioral inclinations of all agents in the community,
are bounded below by the collectively efficient resource use level and above by
the static Nash equilibrium level. This amounts to requiring that both agent
types follow practices that are above those that would maximize collective util-
ity, but to a different extent: the defectors ignore the emergent social norm
prescribing the socially agreed-upon acceptable individual effort ec by choosing
a greater level ed (we consider a range of values up to the individually rational
3These assumptions are generally employed in the literature concerning resource exploita-
tion in a common pool resource, such as, for example, a fishery where a community of fishermen
have access to it and each can decide on the individual level of exploitation (jointly affecting
the sustainability of the resource utilization). Cf. [31, 38, 24].
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but inefficient Nash equilibrium level resulting in excessive resource use), while
cooperators stick to ec, which, as a special case, may coincide with the level that
efficiently trades off the individual incentive towards high or uncoordinated re-
source utilization with the social need to impose constraints to guarantee a
sustainable use (which ultimately benefits all individuals). Letting Eeff be the
community efficient level, eeff =Eeff/n the corresponding individual efficient
level under symmetry, and enash be the Nash equilibrium individual level of
effort, we formalize what is stated above as: eeff ≤ ec < ed ≤ enash. A direct
implication of such constraints is that Eeff ≤ E ≤ Enash. See Dasgupta and
Heal ([8], 55-60) for a comprehensive treatment of exhaustible resources, and
Oses-Eraso, Viladrich-Grau ([24], 398) for the description of a process leading
to the prevalence of one representative strategy for each type of behavior. In
§2.3 we restrict attention to eeff = ec, i.e. we hypothesize that the emergent
norm prescribes collectively optimal extraction levels, but, differently from the
cited literature, we consider what happens for different magnitudes of defection
(allowing ed to range from slightly above eeff to Nash effort levels).
These conditions guarantee that, at the aggregate level, positive rents from
productive use of the resource can be maintained. That is, the average prod-
uct of labor is assured to be above the opportunity cost of labor indepen-
dently from the share of defectors, providing the incentive for agents to increase
their resource use (as they can earn positive profits for positive levels of ef-
fort; see Figure A.1 for a graphical representation). It is further assumed that
f(0, R) = 0 = f(E, 0) for the obvious reason that strictly positive levels of effort
and resource are required to generate income via the function f(E,R). The in-
dividual payoff given resource R and the behaviour of all community members
is:
pii(e1, e2, . . . , en, R) =
ei
E
f(E,R)− wei (1)
Letting R∗ be the equilibrium resource level (to be defined more precisely
below) and Π(e1, e2, . . . , en, R) =
∑n
i=1 pii = f(E,R)−wE, the optimal solution
to the aggregate payoff maximization problem is given by Eeff = arg max E(Π),
and satisfies f ′(Eeff , R∗) = w , where w is the opportunity cost of labor w. An
example of a function guaranteeing the existence of an optimal solution, at
each point in time, to the aggregate payoff maximization problem, is the Cobb-
Douglas formulation with decreasing returns to scale: f(E,R) = γEαt ∗ Rβt ,
∀E ≥ 0, R > 0 and α + β < 1. In the For the sake of compactness and to
stress that the payoff to i is only indirectly affected by the others’ choice of
effort (through f(E,R)), we will use the notation pii(ei, R) below. We know
that, due to the negative appropriation externality arising from the disconnect
between individual extraction and knowledge of its effect on the resource stock,
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the aggregate level of effort in equilibrium if all agents play according to the
Nash equilibrium will be above Eeff as each individual will treat the resource
stock as fixed and therefore extract more resource than is efficient.
2.1 Resource dynamics
Let’s turn to the resource dynamics and the interaction with the social dynam-
ics occurring as a result of human action. Focusing on the ecological features
governing the resource first, in the absence of human appropriation we are left
with the constant resource inflow (c) and a term dependent on the resource level
(R) as well as on three parameters (d, k and Rmax governing the discharge, cur-
vature and maximum storage capacity) to account for a positive rate of growth
up to the Rmax (e.g. the upper limit in a groundwater aquifer’s intake), which
becomes negative beyond that level. We follow [14] for what concerns the above
mentioned ecological variables, and include the aggregate resource use by the
individuals (ER), which appear as the last term of the equation:
R˙ = c− d( R
Rmax
)k − ER (2)
R˙ indicates the time derivative of the resource stock, i.e. its overall rate of
change resulting from the interaction of replenishment, discharge and utiliza-
tion. Note that the resource replenishment rate, which is captured by the first
term in the right-hand side of (2), is exogenous with respect to the frequency
of cooperators (and consequently the resource extraction), which affects instead
the second and last terms, respectively representing the limits to resource accu-
mulation (due to stock effects) and the resource utilized by the community for
productive tasks such as irrigation.
Figure 2: The rate of change of the resource as a function of its stock, in the
absence of appropriation (E= 0). The discharge rate d is set equal to the inflow
c to maintain a carrying capacity equal to Rmax.
For the sake of concreteness, one can think of agents extracting water for
irrigation purposes from an underground reservoir subject to replenishment due
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to snowmelt or rain, whose ability to store water has a natural upper bound
(Rmax). Beyond it, discharge occurs at a rate that is increasing in the deviation
from the maximum storage capacity. Two facts are worth noting at this point.
First, in the absence of extraction, the equilibrium resource level will settle on
Rmax. This is true since, if the stock at one point in time is to its left (R1
in Figure 2), the resource will continue to accumulate (R˙ > 0) until Rmax is
reached; if instead the stock at a given time is to its right (R2), discharge will
bring it back to Rmax. Secondly, due to human extraction, the equilibrium
resource level R∗ will actually be below the maximum storage capacity.4 With
these notions in mind, we are now ready to shift attention to the strategies and
tradeoffs faced by the two types of agents.
2.2 Equity-driven ostracism
Recall that equation (1) represents the amount an individual appropriator can
make based on his/her effort and the yield, abstracting from costs originating
from social stigma (and the consequential ostracism imposed by the commu-
nity on defectors). This amount is proportional to the aggregate payoff (itself a
function of the production function f), in relation to the individual’s resource
uptake ei, which positively enters in the first term in the right hand side of (1)
and negatively in the second term representing the work-related costs. To ac-
count for the costs accruing to norm violators when identified by the community
as such, we incorporate them as shown:
Ui = pii − ω(fc)max
{
pii − pic
pid
, 0
}
= ei(
f(E,R)
E
− w)− ω(fc)max
{
ei − ec
ed
(f(E,R)
E
− w), 0
}
(3)
This translates to a payoff to a norm complier (cooperator) that is simply
given by
Uc = pic (4)
4In fact, due to the boundary conditions on the effort levels and (1), the equilibrium re-
source level will satisfy the condition 0 < Rnash ≤ R∗ ≤ Reff < Rmax, where Rnash is the
resource level corresponding to monomorphic Nash behavior (a population comprised solely
of individuals maximizing profits taking R as exogenous), and Reff is the socially optimal
level that would obtain if all individuals jointly maximized collective welfare (effectively inter-
nalizing the appropriation externality). Therefore, depending on the population composition,
and consequently on the aggregate extraction, the equilibrium level R∗ will be closer to one
of the above two boundaries: in a dimorphic population comprised of a majority of defectors,
R∗ will be close to Rnash, while its distance from Reff will be shorter the more the number
of cooperators. Note that according to the above inequality, even under full defection there is
a positive resource value (0 < Rnash) guaranteeing the assumed positive rents.
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while a norm violator will be subject to:
Ud = pid − ω(fc)pid − pic
pid
(5)
Raakjær and Mathiesen [33] found, among the five more relevant factors
affecting compliance in Danish fisheries: the economic gains to be obtained from
noncompliance, deterrence and sanctioning costs, and the presence of “norms
(behaviour of other fishers) and morals”. In (5), the gains appear in pid, while
the losses due to the sanctions and the comparison with others are captured
by the product ω(fc)((pid − pic)/pid). Notice that the strongest action against
defectors will be taken when the number of cooperators is largest (i.e. pid − pic
and ω(fc) are highest), while when defection is spread all over it will go almost
unnoticed (i.e.pid ≈ pic and ω(fc) is low).
Recalling the tradeoffs highlighted in Figure 1, one sees from the compari-
son of (4) and (5) that, for what concerns the productivity, defectors have an
advantage (pid > pic) as a consequence of their higher appropriation; due to
stock effects, such productivity advantage positively depends on the relative
abundance of cooperators. On the other hand, defectors are deprived of the
communitarian social capital and experience a reduction to the income gen-
erated with resource-intensive productive activities, while cooperators can also
tap in the community for help and thus enjoy the entire yield pic. As compliance
to the social norm is voluntary and observable (via differences in the yield of
the production, since the latter depends on the amount of resource extraction),
these benefits are denied to non-members; further, in light of [19], it is assumed
that the community ostracism function ω(fc) is positive and increasing in the
number of participants (abiding to the social norm), once a critical mass f c has
been established. As fc further rises, the group’s sanctioning ability increases
less than proportionally ( growth is slowest at the start and end of a time period
Lastly, we note that in (5) ω(fc) multiplies the ratio between the payoff
difference and the defector’s payoff, to model a reaction by the cooperators
which is stronger the larger the relative intensity of the defection (leading to a
larger negative productivity gap of norm followers with respect to defectors).
2.3 Evolution of ostracism
The analysis of the behavioral evolution of agents facing decisions on their re-
source practices is conducted by means of replicator dynamics [36]. By so doing,
we avoid the complete rationality requirements typical of models of optimization,
while retaining (myopic and lagged) convergence towards better outcomes due
to the imitation of successful behavior. Such an approach is particularly well-
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Figure 3: Ostracism function according to the Gompertz growth function
ω(fc) = hete
gfc , where h, t, g are parameters governing, respectively, the maxi-
mum sanctioning (asymptote), the sanctioning effectiveness threshold (displace-
ment) and the growth rate of the function. e is the Euler’s number, h = 0.34,
t = −150, g = −10.
suited to the analysis of the evolution of norm adoptions as it allows us to focus
on emergent phenomena without being confined, as is the case for neoclassi-
cal analysis, to equilibrium outcomes and representative agents solely described
by their optimizing behavior. Here, rather than rationally best responding to
the actions of others as in Nash equilibrium, individuals update their strategies
when given the option, and switch to the strategy of the agent with which they
are randomly matched if the utility of the latter is above the individual’s. It
can be shown that such strategy revision takes place with a probability that is
proportional to the payoff difference with respect to the average: if, for example,
the average is well above the payoff of a cooperator, he or she is more likely to
notice the benefits from switching than if the average were only slightly above
the agent’s payoff. Formally, this leads to the 2-strategy replicator dynamics,
which combined with (3) yields, after rearranging terms:
f˙c = fc(Uc − U¯) = fc(1− fc)(Uc − Ud) = fc(1− fc)pid − pic
pid
(ω(fc)− pid) (6)
The dotted superscript stands for time derivative: equation (6) models the
evolution of cooperating types. We are interested in the nullclines satisfying
f˙c = 0: in addition to the monomorphic outcomes characterized by one type of
agent only, we look for solutions in which positive amount of both types coexist
(with fc 6= 0 and fc 6= 1). That is,
(fc∗, R∗) : θ(fc∗, R∗) =
pid(ed, R∗)− pic(ec, R∗)
pid(ed, R∗)
(ω(fc∗)− pid(ed, R∗)) = 0 (7)
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The system described in (2)-(6) can be represented in the (µ, fc) parame-
ter space, where µ is the effort multiplier between a cooperator and a defector;
for instance, in Figure 4, µ = 2 signifies that the defector’s effort is twice the
cooperator’s effort, while µnash signifies that ed = enash. While only one type
of defector is considered at a time (as well as one cooperator type satisfying
µ = 1 and extracting at the collectively efficient level), Figure 4 allows one
to investigate the prospects for cooperation for different levels of defection. We
deem it useful to condense this information in the compact graphical tool below,
since, depending on the social and ecological characteristics of the system under
consideration, the concept of defection may vary greatly. For example, in a rel-
atively well-established community (both in a temporal and spatial dimension),
it may be reasonable to expect that a clear and shared notion of norm violation
has taken shape over time, and therefore that defectors are somewhat cautious
and refrain from extracting at a very high level (such as µnash). On the other
hand, a relatively new community, or one which is more spatially fragmented,
may be characterized by higher defection levels (e.g. µ > 2), due to the lack
of clarity over what the acceptable behavior is. Figure 4 illustrates the fate of
cooperation for different definitions of defection, i.e. µ levels, in order to cap-
ture these different cases in a comprehensive manner. Given the positive value
of the first three terms on the right hand side of (6), (with the exception of
degenerate cases), it is straightforward that the proportion of cooperators will
increase (f˙c > 0) provided that ω(fc) > pid(ed, R). Where the system ultimately
stabilizes depends on the initial conditions: however, as we can readily observe
from Figure 4, we have both areas characterized by the presence of one type
of agent only and areas of coexistence. Note that with an increase in cooper-
ators the ostracism ω(fc) increases, but so does the defector payoff pid(ed, R),
because productivity increases with an increase in fc due to the higher resource
level; such interaction causes non-trivial dynamics that are analyzed here under
the evolutionary lens provided by the replicator equation. In the Appendix we
derive results from the stability analysis based on the linearization matrix J of
the system (2)-(6), which shows that:
a) the Defector equilibrium is a stable attracting fixed point;
b) the Cooperator equilibrium is stable so long as the defector’s payoff is
bounded above by the full compliance ostracism costs, i.e. ω(1) > pid.
What happens for intermediate frequencies of cooperators? From (7) we know
that, if it exists, the coexistence equilibrium must satisfy ω(fc∗) = pid(ed, R∗).
Inspection of the curves in Figure 4 allows one to assess the qualitative features
of the system resulting from the above condition: to the left of locus a, i.e. for
low initial fc, ω(fc) < pid(ed, R), so the system will evolve towards the stable
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Figure 4: The ω(f∗c ) = pid(ed, R∗) loci guaranteeing coexistence of types (given
the ostracism function in Fig. 3), superimposed on the contours of the resource
function at equilibrium (brighter shades indicate higher resource levels). The
cooperators extract at the social optimum, while defectors above it, according
to their type as given by the effort multiplier µ: given the latter (e.g. µ = 2.5)
one can determine which equilibrium arises for a given initial fc (e.g. a Mixed
equilibrium on locus b with relatively high R∗ for fc = 0.8). The highest level
of µ on the y-axis corresponds to µnash, and yields, depending on the initial
fc, either a Mixed or a Defector equilibrium (both with the minimal R∗in their
category).
defector equilibrium independently of µ. If, for instance, we consider defectors
who extract resource according to the Nash rule (µnash : ed = enash), the equi-
librium will be characterized by ω(0) = 0 < pid(ed, Rnash) (see footnote 4). To
the right of locus a, ω(fc) > pid(ed, R), so the community of appropriators fol-
lowing the restrictive norm will grow larger. The system will transition towards
the cooperator equilibrium when the effort difference between cooperators and
defectors is not too large (low µ), as the above inequality will continue to hold
until stable monomorphic cooperation obtains, with ω(1) > pid(ed, Reff) (see
Figure 4 and footnote 4). When instead effort differences are large, the propor-
tion of cooperators will keep increasing up to a point where ω(fc∗) = pid(ed, R∗):
at this point population composition does not change any longer and the mixed
equilibrium persists. The same obtains when starting to the right of locus b; in
other words, b is a stable locus of mixed equilibria. Note that this is not true
for locus a, which is unstable.
16
(a) t = −6 (b) t = −160
(c) t = −165 (d) t = −400
Figure 5: The ω(f∗c ) = pid(ed, R∗) coexistence nullclines with increasingly inef-
fective sanctioning at low fc. The insets represent ostracism functions according
to the Gompertz growth function ω(fc) = hete
gfc , parametrized to deprive the
ostracism of efficacy below a varying f c threshold. h and g are fixed at 0.34 and
−10 and t is varied so that the threshold is increasingly larger.
3 Social and resource variation
3.1 Varying the effectiveness of ostracism
To investigate the impact of the threshold fc (i.e. the minimum level beyond
which the community of norm followers becomes effective in ostracising the vio-
lators) on the evolution of cooperation, we vary the parameter t of the ostracism
function (Figure 3). Figure 5 depicts the nullclines corresponding to alternative
ostracism functions (in the insets).
As t increases in (absolute) magnitude, so does the minimum percentage
of the population that is required for the community sanctions to be effective.
In the inset of Figure 5a, at low fc a small amount of ostracism is already in
place, while the effectiveness threshold is fc > 30% in Fig. 5b and Fig.5c, and
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fc > 40% in Fig.5d. While the sanctioning ability of the cooperating community
is quite similar in Fig. 5b and Fig.5c, they are used to illustrate how a further
(albeit small) rightward shift of the threshold leads to a qualitative shift in the
landscape of the equilibria. The basin of attraction of the Defector equilibrium
now comprises the entire fc space for values of µ that are roughly between 3.1
and 3.7, while for even higher values of µ, a small coexistence area is again
present (right hand side of the top nullcline). At such high level of extraction
on the defectors’ part, violating the norm and extracting above the optimal level
pays off both when the cooperating community is very large (and free riding on
its restraint outweighs the ostracism costs) and when it is smaller ( fc / 0.6, due
to its limited sanctioning ability). However, for a small neighborhood around
65% cooperation, norm followers fare better thanks to the increased ostracism
costs they are able to impose on defectors. To the right of the coexistence ray,
the situation is again reversed to ω < pid, since the high profits that can be made
by deviating from the norm when the resource is close to the social optimum
outweigh the ostracism costs.
The bottom nullcline in Fig. 5c also concerns polymorphic equilibria (to
the right of the peak), while for µ / 2, depending on the intitial fc, the system
transitions to either a Cooperator equilibrium or a Defector equilibrium. Lastly,
in Fig. 5d the top nullcline disappears and the bottom one shrinks, but both a
(small) area of coexistence and the monomorphic equilibria are retained.
Similar analyses are conducted in the following two figures, which respec-
tively show the disruptive effect of incresingly slower ostracism emergence and
incresingly ineffective sanctioning on the evolution of cooperation.
Across all the variations presented in this section, commonalities are ev-
ident in terms of the types of the emergent equilibria. On one end of the
spectrum, when conditions are extremely favorable for cooperators due to their
high sanctioning ability (Fig. 7a), only monomorphic equilibria obtain, with
the Cooperator equilibrium having the larger basin of attraction. In this case
the amount of defection (µ) is almost irrelevant to the outcome, as the (initial)
relative size of the cooperating community solely determines the evolutionary
trajectory. For many intermediate specifications, areas of coexistence appear
in the (fc, µ) space: while stable, these polymorhic equilibria take place for a
range of µ, outside of which the system eventually evolves to a monomorphic
equilibrium (e.g. Fig. 6b). As the ostracism effectivess is further reduced, the
basin of attraction of the Defector equilibrium expands, at the expense of the
Cooperator equilibrium which at a certain point disappears (e.g. for h < .2, c.f.
Fig. 7d).
18
(a) g = −10 (b) g = −9
(c) g = −8 (d) g = −6
Figure 6: The ω(f∗c ) = pid(ed, R∗) coexistence nullclines with incresingly slower
ostracism emergence. The insets represent ostracism functions according to the
Gompertz growth function ω(fc) = hete
gfc ; h and t are fixed at 0.34 and −150
here, and the growth rate g is progressively diminshed.
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(a) h = 2 (b) h = .5
(c) h = .3 (d) h = .2
Figure 7: The ω(f∗c ) = pid(ed, R∗) coexistence nullclines with incresingly inef-
fective sanctioning. The insets represent ostracism functions according to the
Gompertz growth function ω(fc) = hete
gfc ; t and g are fixed at −150 and −10
here and the maximum sanctioning h is progressively diminshed.
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3.2 Variable resource inflow
In reality resource flows are subject to variation. If one considers for instance
water availability, particularly in semi-arid regions it can vary drastically within
and between years. Climate change is likely to increase this variability and lead
to more frequent extreme events. This puts additional pressure on water users
that have to cope and adapt to changing resource conditions. To assess the
effect of inflow variability on the stability of cooperation we consider the impact
of introducing a perturbed variable inflow to the resource pool. The modified
resource dynamics becomes:
R˙ = c˜− d( R
Rmax
)k − ER (8)
where c˜ is a random variable with mean c, following a symmetric unimodal
distribution. The following reasoning shows that with an increase in the vari-
ability of inflow to the common resource pool, the percentage of cooperators in
the mixed equilibrium increases, thus indicating an advantage for cooperators.
This is due to the concavity of the resource function at R˙ = 0 (see Figure 2),
which leads to a decrease in the average resource volume with inflow variability.
Recalling the analysis of Section 2, letting R˜ < R be the perturbed resource
volume at time t, we note that the corresponding payoff p˜ii(ei, R˜) < pii(ei, R),
which implies that p˜id(ed, R˜) < pid(ed, R). However, the ostracism function is
independent of R, so the basin of attraction of the Cooperator equilibrium ex-
pands at the expense of that of the Defector Equilibrium. Put differently, a
lower average resource volume leads to reduced payoffs for both defectors and
cooperators. Defectors, however, are also subject to ostracism which is only
a function of the frequency of cooperators and thus is not affected by inflow
variability. Therefore, the decrease in defector payoff with unchanged ostracism
costs decreases the frequency of defectors in the ensuing equilibria.
4 Summary
In this paper we have developed a model of community-based appropriation of
a common pool resource in the presence of a norm allowing discrimination of
resource use behavior. Burton [4] suggests that a ‘possible method to encour-
age collective action is the use of some form of sanctions on those who deviate
from the group. Sanctions may take the form of a “loss of respect” [13], “social
pressures aimed at creating personal shame” [30], or “social excommunication”
[30]’. In the context developed here, individuals departing from what the com-
munity considers as acceptable behavior (in terms of non-excessive resource
21
extraction), are therefore subject to what we call equity-driven ostracism: a de-
nial of support by the cooperating community which has tangible consequences
on the wealth of the norm violators. Such retaliation, which may be thought
of as consisting of spiteful actions (e.g. denied machinery lending and crop de-
struction) or social reprobation (e.g. negative gossiping and refusal to share
information), depends on two factors. On the one hand the relative strength of
the community of norm followers, since a larger community is assumed to be
more effective at ostracizing defectors. Secondly, the intensity of the response
by the community is assumed to be higher the larger the entity of the defection,
which is revealed by the differences in the yield of the production, as the latter
depends on the amount of resource extraction. Another noteworthy feature is
that we model the coupled socio-economic and ecological dynamics of a common
pool resource, such as water, that provides benefits indirectly by being utilized
as an input of production rather than for its intrinsic value (as is the case for
fish in fisheries). Sections 2 and 3 considered cooperation as the outcome of an
evolutionary process, with successful strategies spreading in the population as
a result of a process of imitation. We find that:
a) A Defector equilibrium, unregulated by the norm, is achieved when the com-
munity of cooperators is unable to engage in effective ostracism, either
because of its small size relative to the population, or because of its inef-
fectiveness.Otherwise, the system evolves to either (b) or (c).
b) A Cooperator equilibrium, where all abide to the norm, arises so long as the
defector’s payoff is bounded above by the full compliance ostracism costs:
ω(1) > pid(ed, Reff ). This is the case when the effort differences between
cooperators and defectors are not too large.
c) Stable coexistence obtains for a range of intermediate specifications, in sit-
uations that are not particularly favorable for either type, sparing both
from being eradicated: ω(fc∗) = pid(ed, R∗).
d) Under variable resource replenishment rates, cooperators thrive better, be-
cause they can still benefit from the social capital provided by other coop-
erators despite a reduction in average resource volumes, while the defectors
experience a decrease in payoffs to p˜id(ed, R˜).
The model presented here focuses on agents harvesting from a renewable re-
source while facing a social norm discerning between acceptable and excessive
behavior. Notwithstanding its simplicity, it allows to identify three regimes
for the stationary state of the evolutionary dynamics, depending on the initial
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number of norm followers, the effort gap between types and the community ef-
fectiveness in enforcing the norm. In (a) the resource is severely over-harvested,
a situation reminiscent of the tragedy of the commons; in (b) the resource is
efficiently shared by a homogeneous population restricting use to the collec-
tively optimal level; in (c) both type coexist and manage to partially internalize
the externality. Where the system ultimately converges depends on the path
followed.
Appendix
Stability analysis
In this section we shed light on the monomorphic equilibria found in §2.3 by
means of the stability analysis based on the linearization matrix J of the system
(2)-(6):
J =
[
∂ f˙cfc ∂
f˙c
R
∂ R˙fc ∂
R˙
R
]
=
[
ϕ[ω′(fc)(f − f2c ) + ω(fc)(1− 2fc) + (2fc − 1)pid] 0
nR(ed − ec) −dkRk−1Rkmax − E
]
where ϕ = pid(ed,R)−pic(ec,R)pid(ed,R)
The diagonal terms of J are the eigenvalues, and since ∂ R˙R < 0, whether an
equilibrium is asymptotically stable depends on the sign of ∂f˙c/fc. When fc = 0,
both eigenvalues of J are negative real numbers and the Defector equilibrium is
a stable attracting fixed point. When fc = 1, ∂f˙c/fc = ϕ(pid − ω(1)), which is
negative provided that ω(1) > pid. Thus, the Cooperator equilibrium is stable so
long as the defector’s payoff is bounded above by the full compliance ostracism
costs.
Calculation of effort
Consider the production function F (E,R) = γEαRβ . Recalling the equilibrium
condition for the resource, R˙ = c−d( RRmax )k−ER = 0, for k = 2 its dependence
on the aggregate effort level (and consequently on fc) can be expressed as follows:
R∗ = (−E +
√
E2 + 4c d
R2max
)R
2
max
2d (A.1)
Alternatively, at resource equilibrium, E(R∗) = cR∗ − dR2maxR
∗.
Following [8], the static efficient effort Eeff is the solution of the collective
welfare maximization problem where individuals act cooperatively assuming all
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remaining (n−1) agents extract ec as well, which yields the following condition:
F ′(Eeff , R∗) = w (A.2)
At the opposite end of the spectrum, a community comprised of all defectors
following the Nash rule (with µ = µnash as described in Section 2.3), will col-
lectively exert Enash solving:
F (Enash, R∗)
Enash
− 1
n
(F (Enash, R
∗)
Enash
− F ′(Enash, R∗) = w (A.3)
For the parameters utilized in Fig. 2 and Figures 4-A.1 (w = 15, c =
d = 50, Rmax = 200, n = 50, γ = 10, α = .6 and β = .2), the solutions to
(A.2) and A.3 are Eeff (R∗ = 84.91) = 0.483 and Enash(R∗ = 26.89) = 1.826,
respectively (the latter occurs at µ’s upper bound for, µnash = 3.781). Then
the individual appropriation efforts are simply calculated as eeff =Eeff/n and
and enash =Enash/n.
Figure A.1: Aggregate production resulting from different levels of resource
appropriation. At Eeff all agents abide to the norm, while at ENash they all
ignore the appropriation externality (while still making positive rents, since the
open access effort Eopen > ENash.
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